



# Voting policy

## 2022

Confidence  
must be earned

**Amundi**  
ASSET MANAGEMENT

# Amundi

## Voting policy 2022

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# General principles

Amundi voting policy is in line with its vision as a Responsible Investor. Right from when it was created in 2010, Amundi considered this dimension of responsibility as one of its four founding pillars. Our voting policy is a key component of our responsible investment policy.

1

## An integrated approach to companies

Issues of social responsibility and sustainable development, such as those of governance, are essential in the assessment of a company. Only a global vision of the company, going beyond the purely financial aspects and integrating all risks and opportunities, in particular for ESG criteria (Environment, Social, Governance), allows an assessment of its intrinsic value and long-term economic performance.

Social and environmental dimensions are not mutually contradictory but complement one another. The social acceptance of a company's practices contributes to its image, and therefore indirectly to its development and profitability for its shareholders. In addition, as a diversified investor, we must also take into account factors affecting the environment, social and human rights aspects, as well as elements related to governance or corruption, even when they do not have a direct, short or medium term impact on the value of a company as this can have an impact on society and the global economy.

Our voting policy is in line with this approach and is therefore directly based on our analysis of a company in all these aspects.

2

## Regular dialogue in pursuit of progress

The situation and practices of a company must be assessed over time. Amundi wishes to take into account, in its analysis, the evolution of these practices and the commitments made by the company with a view to their improvement. Amundi bases its assessments on regular exchanges with the company, which contribute to a good appreciation of this momentum.

We exercise our responsibility as an investor in the following three areas:

- Shareholder dialogue with companies, allowing ongoing exchange on their main financial performance and social responsibility issues as well as their related action plans.

- The consideration, in investment decisions, of ESG factors, based in particular on a proprietary rating system, calibrated specifically for each business sector.
- The voting policy, through which we influence corporate policies and aim to ensure consistency with the selected areas for improvement.

Our voting choices are consistent with this commitment to dialogue to pursue regular progress.

3

## A transparent approach

The approach of dialogue and progressive improvement that we pursue presupposes a relationship of trust with the companies in which we invest.

Amundi wants companies to communicate widely on their non-financial performance and on how ESG parameters are taken into account in their strategy and practices. We believe the involvement of the Board and governance bodies in these matters is essential. We therefore strongly encourage the publication of an "integrated report" or, failing that, of a social and environmental report making it possible to assess the consideration of societal issues and the objectives that the company sets itself in this area.

In turn, Amundi is committed to transparency and where possible, it informs issuers of planned negative votes.

The positions we express in our votes should not take companies unawares. They are the result of our analysis and dialogue, the determinants of which are known.

4

## Engagement priority reaffirmed to two societal issues

Amundi has been focusing its voting efforts on two priority themes: the energy transition and social cohesion. Both topics represent systemic risks for companies as well as opportunities for those who wish to integrate them in a positive way.

## **The energy transition, in particular the decarbonisation of our economies**

Phase out from coal is paramount to achieve this goal, and we believe that the adoption of climate strategies by companies is a critical factor of investment of which shareholders should be fully informed. In that sense, Amundi is supporting resolutions that strive to implement better reporting and transparency on companies' climate-related strategy.

In addition, Amundi encourages issuers to have an annual advisory vote at the AGM on the company's climate strategy (ex ante vote), and another resolution on the ex post implementation of this strategy. As climate issues have potentially a very material impact on the company's business model, Amundi considers it essential that shareholders be able to comment on the company's decarbonisation strategy (covering all scopes) by clearly understanding the assumptions made, including with regard to recourse to compensation carbon offsetting, on the scenarios retained, the objectives in terms of investment and research.

Amundi wants to understand how the Board of Directors deals with this key subject, how it gets concrete training, how it analyzes the impact of climate issues on the business model by studying stress tests, for example using carbon prices consistent with a net zero scenario or even more degraded. Amundi also wants the remuneration of the top management to be aligned with the strategy of alignment with the Paris Agreement via the KPIs included in the variable remuneration, more specifically on the climate high impact sectors<sup>1</sup>.

For companies that are excluded from our active investment universe according to the "Amundi Responsible Investment policy", and on a selection of companies with poor climate strategy while they operate in sectors for which transition is paramount for the alignment with the Paris Agreement, our policy will consist of voting against the discharge of the board or management, or the reelection of the Chairman and of some Directors.

## **Social cohesion, in particular through controls of the wage balance within the framework of remuneration policies, employee involvement in companies' governance and employee share ownership**

In terms of remuneration policy, we would like companies to communicate at the group level on the consolidated "pay equity ratio" (average pay to CEO pay ratio) and on the evolution of this ratio. It will be assessed depending on the sector and the location of the company's activities.

Other aspects are also the subject of particular analysis, such as the maintenance of a "living wage" throughout the supply chain, the gender pay gap and other value-sharing parameters. The right balance in terms of sharing added value also concerns support for employees to maintain their employability throughout their careers, and their access to social protection.

Amundi is also in favour of employee involvement in corporate governance and employee share ownership, as these practices help align the interests of shareholders and employees over the long term. Amundi thus promotes the appointment of employee Directors as a principle of good governance.

In terms of voting, our policy will consist of voting against the discharge of the Board or the Management, or the reelection of the Chairman and certain Directors:

- on a selection of companies which have an insufficient climate or environmental strategy while operating in sectors for which the transition is essential for alignment with the Paris Agreement,
- on a selection of companies with controversial social practices,
- for companies excluded from our active investment universe in accordance with Amundi's "Responsible Investment Policy".

## **5**

## **A pragmatic approach, taking into account each company's context**

The regulatory, cultural or economic environment in which a company operates can be decisive for some of its choices, notably in societal areas.

Amundi has defined a universal common basis for its voting policy based on the fundamental governance principles and shareholder rights that Amundi expects to be applied and respected globally. Amundi exercises its stewardship responsibility on behalf of its clients on all five continents.

That said, the implementation of this policy is adapted to each of these local contexts. Our decisions are always made with a view to defending the interests of our clients by supporting the creation of sustainable long-term value. To do that, Amundi considers each company's context in a pragmatic manner to make sure its voting decisions are effective.

1. Oil & gas, utilities, mining companies, transportation, cement, steel & aluminium, construction, industrials, infrastructure.



# Shareholders' rights

A corporate governance regime must protect and facilitate the exercise of shareholders' rights and ensure fair treatment of all shareholders, including minority and foreign shareholders.

## 1 General Meeting

The general meeting is the place where voting rights are exercised and therefore a central element of corporate governance. We are therefore opposed to anything that could limit, hinder its operation or reduce the scope of its jurisdiction. Resolutions should not be bundled together as shareholders should be able to express their views on each separate item.

Access to high-quality prior information in a timely manner is an essential component of a well-considered exercise of voting rights by shareholders.

Amundi considers it necessary to publish an explanatory document on the proposed resolutions. Indeed, resolutions are only the legal expression of management's proposals to shareholders and do not always make it possible to understand the strategic context of the request, the conditions for its implementation or other elements necessary to inform the voting decision.

This document should not be limited to a mere paraphrase of the text of the resolutions but should allow the best possible understanding of the company's strategic position.

## 2 Voting rights and shareholder retention

Amundi is in favour of a fair expression of shareholders through their voting rights.

Nevertheless, aware of the importance for companies to retain and stabilize their shareholders with a view to long-term development, we are not opposed to the allocation of double votes to long-term shareholders as long as they are accessible to all and do not lead to disproportionate control to the detriment of minority shareholders.

Any change in voting rights must be the subject of a resolution submitted to the vote of the General Meeting. This must be accompanied by a detailed statement of reasons drawn up by the Board.

Amundi determines its vote based on the structure of the shareholder base, the level of control thus generated for long-term shareholders and the motivation expressed by the Board.

In a logic of developing a long-term shareholder base, we are a priori in favour of the implementation of loyalty tools, such as the bonus dividend or *loyalty shares*, provided that they are open to all shareholders and supervised in their application.

## 3 Anti-takeover measures

Any public offer must be submitted to the vote of the shareholders. We oppose a priori any permanent or preventive anti-takeover measures, which we often consider to be contrary to the interests of shareholders.

If specific measures are proposed, we will analyze the specific conditions of the company and its stakeholders. Only mechanisms that would make it possible to obtain a better valuation of the offer and/or ensure equal treatment of shareholders (particularly in the event of a creeping takeover) may be accepted.

## 4 Integrity balance and transparency

Fair, complete and transparent financial and non-financial information is essential to the exercise of shareholders' rights. The presence of a predominantly independent audit committee is required.

The quality of the financial and non-financial information will be taken into account in our decision to vote on the financial statements. Insufficient information may lead to abstention or even a negative vote.

### Payment of a responsible dividend

The decision to vote will depend on the company's financial situation over time, in particular the percentage allocated to distribution and its impact on the financial structure.

We strongly believe that dividend policy should balance shareholders needs for remuneration in cash, with the need to preserve financial strengths of the company as well as the long-term interest of employees to pave the way for future earnings growth. We will be particularly careful that the distribution policy of dividends does not hamper the long-term investment capacity of the company, does not weaken its financial solidity, nor does it lead to a sharing of added value unfavorable to employees.

### Discharge of the Directors

Refusal is possible in certain cases of serious breaches of corporate governance standards, overall performance (economic, financial, social and environmental) deemed deficient and affecting the valuation of the company, lack of adequate climate strategy or reservations made by the auditors on the financial statements.

### Choice and remuneration of statutory auditors

In order to avoid situations of conflict of interest and to ensure the quality and independence of the audit, certain situations may lead to a negative vote or abstention by Amundi: excessive advisory fees compared to those of the audit, statutory auditor/auditor who has held management positions in the company, etc.

### Regulated agreements

In order to ensure that the company is managed with due regard to the interests of all shareholders, the company must disclose transactions with related parties. In countries where these agreements are subject to shareholder approval, we will vote on the basis of their interest for the company and respect for the rights of minority shareholders.

The lack of sufficient information to determine the interest of the agreement may result in a negative vote. In cases where agreements are not subject to a vote, and in the event of a serious deficiency, our opposition may be expressed through the renewal of members of audit committees and/or statutory auditors. The latter principle also applies in the case of previous agreements that are executed during the financial year and that would not be resubmitted to the vote of the shareholders.

## 5 Resolutions on environmental and social issues put forward by minority shareholders

Amundi views favorably shareholder resolutions asking issuers to increase transparency on environmental and social issues.

# Boards<sup>2</sup>, committees and governing bodies

The Board is a strategic body, its decisions affect the future of the company and the responsibility of its members.

While the Board is accountable to the company and its shareholders, it must also take due account of other stakeholders and respect their interests, in particular those of employees, creditors, clients and suppliers. Compliance with social and environmental standards is also its responsibility. Amundi is fully supporting the eight principles of the World Economic Forum's Climate Governance Initiative, including climate accountability.

1

## Quality of corporate governance information

The quality of information on the company's governance, its changes, its positioning in relation to good market practices and its relations with stakeholders are essential elements for shareholders. They are therefore decisive factors of our voting decisions. Insufficient quality of information may lead to abstention or even a negative vote on resolutions relating to appointments.

### Quality of *Comply or Explain on governance*

In many countries, the "*comply or explain*" principle is an essential element of corporate governance regulation. Companies that refer to a governance code but deviate from certain recommendations will have to explain the reasons for this choice.

In the event of non-application of one or more provisions of the governance code, companies must explicitly publish all recommendations not followed, explain in detail the specific reasons for this deviation and justify in detail the consistency of the alternative solutions adopted. These will be analysed in relation to the proper functioning of governance as a whole and the interests of shareholders, in particular minority shareholders.

2

## Composition and balance of the Board

Amundi considers that the Board must be composed in such a way as to bring together:

- a diversity of Directors with the skills, culture and experience necessary to develop the company's strategy and oversee its implementation,
- a sufficient number of independent Directors: at least 50% for non-controlled companies and at least one third in the case of controlled companies.

In addition, Amundi is attentive to the feminization of Boards, including in countries not subject to any regulatory obligation.

Amundi recommends that:

- the Executive Directors do not hold more than two other directorships outside their group,
- non-executive Directors hold a maximum of four directorships,
- employees be represented on the of Board Directors.

We will be vigilant about the necessary availability of the Chairman of the Board, the Chairs of the various committees - especially audit committee - and the Lead Director because of the growing importance of these functions and the workload they entail. We may therefore recommend that the number of mandates acceptable for a Director holding more than one of these functions be further reduced.

With regard to the term of mandates, we consider it preferable to be able to vote annually on a significant

2. Board and Directors used throughout the policy refers to both Boards of Directors and Supervisory Boards.

proportion of Directors and to limit the term of office to four years. Over eleven full years of mandates in the same company, a Director can no longer be considered as “independent” or “free of interest”.

With regard to Directors’ profiles, we consider it essential to have detailed information on each candidate Director before the vote at the meeting (curriculum vitae, skills brought to the Board of Directors that would justify the choice of this candidate, current mandates).

In addition, it is important to be able to decide individually on each Director when electing the Board of Directors. We oppose, in principle, the election of multiple Directors through a bundled resolution<sup>3</sup>.

The Board must set up specialised committees to prepare its work, including an audit committee, a nominations committee and a remunerations committee. They must be composed in majority of independent Directors.

**Audit Committee:** The task of this committee is to monitor:

- the process of preparing accounting and financial information,
- the effectiveness of internal control and risk management systems,
- the independence and objectivity of the statutory auditors.

**Nominations Committee:** The main responsibility of the Nominations Committee is to seek and propose competent and available candidates for the Board and general management. It must ensure succession planning for corporate officers as part of normal operations or in the event of a sudden crisis or incapacity. The committee must define a “target Board”, its optimal size and the standard profiles of Directors in accordance with the size of the company, the diversity of skills, profiles, culture required in relation to its business sectors, its geographical areas of intervention and its strategic objectives. The Board is ultimately accountable to shareholders for the long-term stewardship of the company. Accordingly, the Board should be accountable for the company’s long-term resilience with respect to potential shifts in the business landscape that may result from climate change, and therefore should be accountable for the climate strategy<sup>4</sup>. Amundi is thus particularly vigilant of the way the Board ensure to collectively have the necessary skills to fulfil this duty. The committee will aim to explain the criteria it used to recommend this “target” structure and to highlight talent gaps so as to improve the functioning of the Board.

**Remunerations Committee:** The remunerations Committee approves the remuneration policy and seeks to align the remuneration of key executives and Directors with the long-term interests of the company and those of its shareholders and other stakeholders.

### 3 A clear distribution of powers in order to limit conflicts of interest

Amundi prefers the functions of Chairman and Chief Executive Officer to be separate. In cases where this separation of powers does not exist, Amundi considers it necessary to have explanations on the reasons justifying this dual function for the same officer. In this case, the creation of a position of Lead independent Director, with specific and distinct functions, is highly recommended.

### 4 Functioning of the Board

We consider it necessary to have access to complete information on the proper functioning of the Board: attendance of Directors, report on Board assessment and on the general functioning of the Board. We might vote against a Director who has a high absenteeism rate without any proper rationale.

### 5 Attendance fees/Remuneration of non-executive Directors

We believe it is necessary to have precise information on the terms and conditions and criteria for distributing the envelope of Directors’ fees among the Directors. In general, we are in favour of a significant portion of Directors’ fees being proportional to the actual presence of each Director.

We consider it is essential to have an explanation in the event of an increase in this envelope.

Particular attention is also paid to the structure of the remuneration (in particular in the case of variable remuneration) of the non-executive Chairman and to the criteria for allocating this remuneration in order to avoid possible conflicts of interest with management.

3. Except for the list proposed by Assogestioni and for countries where a list election system is compulsory.

4. Principle1 World Economic Forum’s Climate Governance Initiative [https://www3.weforum.org/docs/WEF\\_Creating\\_effective\\_climate\\_governance\\_on\\_corporate\\_boards.pdf](https://www3.weforum.org/docs/WEF_Creating_effective_climate_governance_on_corporate_boards.pdf)



# Financial structure

With regard to shareholders' rights, Amundi considers that, unless there is a reasoned and solid project, cumulative capital increases should not represent more than 60% of the capital.

1

## Share issues without preferential subscription rights

Amundi considers that authorisations for routine capital increases without preferential subscription rights (PSR) should not represent more than 10% of the capital, except in special situations where local practices recommend a higher threshold. If better local practices recommend a threshold below 10%, we will align ourselves with this limit. Issues of convertible bonds or any instrument giving access to the capital are treated in the same way.

2

## Share issues with preferential subscription rights

Authorisations for capital increases with preferential subscription rights may in principle not represent more than 50% of the share capital.

Beyond this limit, Amundi will make a case-by-case analysis, assessing the strategic rationale of the increase and in particular if related to a change in the company's strategy and/or corporate purpose.

3

## Mergers, acquisitions, demergers and other restructuring projects

Each project will be studied on a case-by-case basis, in order to examine the medium and long-term strategy, the potential creation of shareholder value and the social and environmental impacts.

4

## Repurchase of own shares

Amundi is not in principle in favour of buying back shares but tolerates share buybacks, up to a maximum of 10% of the capital, when they do not penalise the company's investments over the long term. However, when the company specifies its intention to use the authorisation during a takeover bid, we believe that the share buyback becomes an anti-takeover measure and the vote will be negative.

5

## Employee share ownership

Amundi is in favour of the development of employee share ownership because it aligns the interests of shareholders and employees in the long term. The proposed discounts, which are generally governed by national legislation, must allow for the programmes to have an incentive nature and reflect the period during which shares are blocked for beneficiaries.

# Remuneration policy

1

## General principles on executive remuneration

Amundi analyses executive remuneration **in its entirety** and expresses its vote based on two main criteria: the chief executive's remuneration must be **“reasonable” and economically justified**.

A “reasonable” remuneration must:

- Be **attractive** and enable the company to attract the talent necessary for its management and development. This attractiveness is analysed mainly by **comparison with companies in the same sector** and/or in the same environment.
- Ensure **the alignment of the interests** of the managers with those of the shareholders and those of the company's other stakeholders (notably the employees), within the scope of social and environmental responsibility. The evolution of remuneration over time must therefore be consistent with the trends observed in the company's financial and non-financial performance. Amundi will be vigilant on the inclusion of ESG criteria in the variable remuneration. For companies from sectors highly exposed to climate change and its mitigation (oil & gas, utilities, mining companies, transportation, cement, steel & aluminium, construction, industrials, infrastructure) a climate-related criteria must be included in the variable remuneration metrics.
- Be **“acceptable” from a societal point of view**. The level and evolution of remuneration should not be susceptible of forming the basis for hostile reactions harmful to the company, its image and therefore its development. The analysis of the pay equity ratio contributes to the assessment of this acceptability.
- Include the assumption that outstanding deferred remuneration will not be paid if serious events should occur involving questionable or illegal practices, especially in terms of risk-taking.

2

## Balance of remuneration and value sharing

Amundi is vigilant to ensure that the Remuneration Policy, and more broadly the company's value-sharing policy, do not generate unacceptable situations of social inequality.

Similarly, Amundi is attentive to the absence of discrimination in remuneration policy and practices, notably the absence of an unjustified gap between men and women in equivalent positions.

Amundi considers that companies must ensure that all employees, directly or indirectly employed in the supply chain, should have a minimum “living wage”, consistent with living conditions in the regions where they are employed.

Generally speaking, Amundi is in favour of measures to involve a large number of employees in the company's growth, through profit-sharing agreements or performance-based bonus schemes.

3

## Transparency and remuneration Report

Amundi considers it necessary to be very transparent about remuneration policies and their implementation.

The philosophy and principles for implementing these policies must be explicit, inter alia, on the links between remuneration, performance and performance objectives. Amundi is thus in favour of the publication of remuneration reports, including a description of all the elements paid or granted to executives, which should be submitted to the shareholders' vote. In countries where this vote is only optional, we will be very vigilant as to companies' decision whether or not to put it to a vote.

Amundi is in favour of the existence of variable (at risk) remuneration, exclusively rewarding success, including a zero payment assumption in the event of significant underperformance. These mechanisms must include minimum and maximum limits for variable remuneration levels and be based on clearly defined performance criteria (including ESG KPIs).

Similarly, Amundi is in favour of a deferred payment of part of executives' remuneration. The payment of this deferred portion should be conditional on maintaining a minimum level of company performance in subsequent years, in accordance with the priority given to medium- to long-term performance.

All these elements will be taken into account in our analysis of the company, considering both the current situation and the momentum. As part of the dialogue established with companies, these elements may have an influence on our voting decisions, in particular resolutions relating to executive remuneration and the mandates of Directors in charge of these matters.

## 4

### Stock option and performance share plans

Amundi believes that long-term incentive plans in the form of stock options or performance shares can be an effective tool to align the interests of managers and shareholders.

However, these plans must comply with certain principles to achieve this objective, in particular in the terms of allocation (for stock options, the subscription price must be in line with market conditions at the time of allocation) and in the conditions of final acquisition and/or minimum holding period.

Our vote will therefore depend, in particular, on the following elements:

- Quality of information on the scope of distribution and the split among groups of beneficiaries, with a clear distinction of corporate officers.
- Subscription price and no discount for stock option plans and no repricing mechanism.

- Length of the plans, and deferred and conditional nature (performance conditions) for the beneficiaries.
- Nature (quantifiable objectives that are consistent with the company's strategy) and level of requirement of the performance criteria that determine the final allocation, inclusion of ESG KPIs.
- Total value of the plans awarded (this must remain below 10% of the share capital, except for exceptional and duly justified reasons).

## 5

### Severance pay

In addition to the performance conditions required by law, Amundi requests that the amount of any severance payments of any kind made to executive corporate officers be in line with their length of service, their remuneration and changes in the company's intrinsic value during their term of office. Except in exceptional circumstances, severance pay should not exceed two years of total remuneration.

As with employees, it is desirable that the departure of an executive corporate officer on his/her own initiative should not result in the payment of remuneration.

## 6

### Pension plans

Amundi considers it desirable that supplementary pension plans, if they exist, should be considered as an element of remuneration.

Amundi will pay attention to the terms of these plans and, in particular, to the following aspects:

- Publication of the scope of beneficiaries.
- Minimum presence criteria in the company (Recommendation: 5 years minimum).
- Basis for calculating rights.

# Annex

## Implementation of the voting policy

Amundi adheres to the EFAMA code and participates in various governance bodies such as AFG or ICGN.

### 1 Centralization of the function

Amundi has centralised the exercise of voting rights within a “Corporate Governance” team composed of experts in charge of coordinating all voting-related tasks, specifically:

- Monitoring General Meetings in the voting scope.
- Managing relations with custodians and proxy voting companies.
- Analysing the resolutions proposed by issuers.
- Sharing information and soliciting the opinions of fund managers and of financial and extra-financial analysts.
- Calling and leading voting committees.
- Undertaking pre and post AGMs’ shareholder dialogue.
- Being involved with working forums on governance.

Such centralisation aims at harmonizing the implementation of Amundi’s voting policy. This voting policy covers the following entities:


Amundi Aalan Sdn Bhd (Malaysia)	Amundi Sgr
Amundi Asset Management	Amundi Singapore
Amundi Austria	Amundi UK Ltd.
Amundi Canada	BFT IM
Amundi Deutschland	CPR AM
Amundi Hong Kong	Etoile Gestion
Amundi Iberia	Lyxor Asset Management
Amundi Immobilier	Lyxor International Asset Management
Amundi Ireland	Lyxor Funds Solutions
Amundi Japan (mandates)	Sabadell Asset Management
Amundi Luxembourg	Société Générale Gestion

The team uses the ISS Proxyexchange platform to send its voting instructions. Analysis from ISS, Glass Lewis, and Proxinvest is available to more efficiently identify problematic resolutions, while retaining complete autonomy from their recommendations. ISS also provides customized voting recommendations based on Amundi’s voting policy.

The Committee is chaired by the ESG Supervisor, member of Amundi's General Management Committee. It includes Senior Managers from investment, financial and extra-financial analysis, as well as external advisors. It examines and validates the voting policy.

It reviews the files presented by the voting and engagement analysts and decides on the direction of the vote. This committee is held on a monthly basis but can be summoned as need be.

### Proxy-voting flowchart




\* Reviewed on a yearly basis



### 3 Current method for exercising voting rights

In most cases, voting rights are exercised by correspondence/proxy. Attending a General Meeting to directly exercise voting rights may be useful or necessary in certain cases.



### 4 Voting scope for 2022

To best fulfil its responsibility as an investment management company in the exclusive interest of its clients, Amundi decided to exercise the voting rights of a large majority of its managed UCIs<sup>5</sup>, regardless of their management strategy.

#### Criteria for selecting funds

To avoid any adverse impact on unit holders, there are established criteria for avoiding excessive voting costs and improving efficiency. This applies only to funds with equity assets of at least €15 million. Based on the chosen threshold, funds whose assets are too low need not be retained, and disproportionate costs can be avoided. Nonetheless, certain funds below this threshold may be included in the scope.

The voting right is exercised on the entirety of the shares held, unless the required blocking period threatens to have an adverse impact on the bearer by interfering with

the leeway the portfolio manager needs. Exceptionally, we may not be able to ensure effective voting for some or all of the shares held.

#### Criteria for selecting meetings

The funds exercise their voting rights at the meetings of the companies in which they have an equity investment whenever possible.

However, again in the interests of cost control and increased efficiency, Amundi reserves the right not to exercise the voting rights when it considers the economic cost to be prohibitive in relation to ownership.

#### Delegated management

When the management of an equity portfolio is trusted to an outside manager, that manager may have the voting rights, as provided in the delegation contract.

5. Undertakings for Collective Investment

## 5 Policy on securities lending

Voting rights are exercised for securities held in the portfolio at the time of the General Meeting. To fully exercise these rights, when Amundi is in charge of securities lending, the lent securities are recalled in accordance with local laws, technical constraints, and the

interest of the meeting. Shares are automatically recalled for all meetings considered sensitive. For the ISR label funds, shares are systematically recalled for all issuers several days before Meeting record date in order to hold the rights to vote the meeting.

## 6 Conflicts of interest

In the exercise of the voting rights of its UCIs, Amundi may be faced with situations of potential conflicts of interest.

Measures to prevent and managed this risk have therefore been put in place.

The first preventive measure is the definition and publication of the voting policy validated by the management bodies of the group's management companies.

The second measure consists of submitting to the Voting Committee, for validation prior to the general meeting, the voting proposals for resolutions relating to a pre-established list of listed companies that are sensitive because of their links with Amundi.

These sensitive listed companies for which a potential "conflict of interest" has been pre-identified, are defined as follows:

- (1) Issuers controlling Amundi or owned by Amundi,
- (2) issuers which are our Partners,
- (3) issuers with which Amundi shares an Executive Officer/Director.
- (4) issuers who are among the most significant clients of Amundi.

In addition to these previously identified issuers, the "Corporate Governance" team also submits to the voting committee any potential conflicts of interest that may result from the analysis of resolutions from general meetings.

